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Resumen
Este trabajo intenta mostrar en qué sentido se puede considerar a Popper como un 
filósofo platónico. Según Lawrence Boland, Popper se basa en Platón respecto de lo que considera 
el “verdadero método popperiano”. Para explicar este acercamiento, hemos dividido este escrito en 
dos secciones. En la primera, analizamos la interpretación de Boland de la racionalidad dialógico-
platónica y mostramos que la interpretación de Boland sobre el primer Platón, con la que disen-
timos, es la base textual para su interpretación del “auténtico método popperiano”. En la segunda 
sección trataremos de mostrar que el “socratismo” de Popper encierra en realidad dos significados.
Palabras clave: Racionalidad-diálogo-crítica- fundamentación- verdadero Popper. Boland.
La fundamentación platónica del “verdadero” Popper 
según Lawrence Boland
Abstract
This work attempts to show in what sense Popper can be considered a platonic philos-
opher. According to Lawrence Boland, Popper is based on Plato with regard to what he considers 
the “real Popperian method.” In order to explain this approach, we have divided this writing into 
two sections. In the first one, we analyse Boland´s interpretation of the dialogic-platonic rationality 
and we show that Boland’s interpretation of the first Plato, with which we dissent, is the textual 
base for his interpretation of the “authentic Popperian method.” In the second section we will try 
to show that the Popper´s “Socratism” locks up in fact two meanings. 
Key words: Rationality, dialogue, critic, foundation, real-Popper, Boland. 
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1. Introduction
This work is divided into two main sections. In the first section, 
“The dialogic-platonic rationality according to Lawrence Boland”, we 
analyse the interpretation of the dialogic-platonic rationality that this 
author offers. We begin by giving a global vision of the different types 
of rationality that are usually admitted; we point out one of them, the 
communicative rationality, whose concept is reformulated by Boland tying 
it with the dialogic-platonic rationality. Next, we reconstruct Boland’s 
proposal of rationality as a much “intersubjective - critical rationality.” We 
see how Boland lays the foundations of his proposal of rationality on the 
dialogic-platonic rationality, specifically in Euthyphro, Apology and Crito 
dialogues. According to our interpretation, this argument is, as we try to 
demonstrate, questionable. In the following point we offer our reading of 
the Euthyphro according to which Boland does not establish a criterion 
for the acceptance of a valid interlocutor. Nevertheless, the interpretation 
that Boland offers of the Apology, the Crito and the Euthyphro conforms 
the textual base for his interpretation of the Popperian method. Boland´s 
peculiar vision of the Popperian method is the subject of the second section 
in which we specifically present the “real” Popper according to Boland. Far 
from the falsacionist Popper, that Boland denominates “popular”, the real 
Popper is the one that he calls “Socratic”. In fact, Boland makes use of the 
first platonic dialogues in order to demonstrate that the real Popper is not 
the falsacionist Popper but the Socratic Popper, that is to say, the Popper 
that emphasizes the exercise of the critical reason, as Boland interprets 
it. Our proposal raises the existence of a third Popper, the “oral” Popper, 
based on the same source as Boland, i.e., the Seminary of Tuesday evenings 
during the 50´s in the London School of Economics. 
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2. Section I. 
2.1. The platonic- dialogic rationality by Lawrence Boland.
I.1. Types of rationality: Although the types of rationality can be more than 
the ones mentioned here, apparently there is often no serious disadvantage 
in recognizing the following ones.1 
i) The theoretical rationality of Weberian tradition2, “that dominates 
the reality trough the thought by means of the production of abstract 
concepts”.3 It is then incumbent to the theoretical rationality the 
constitution of the reality by means of theoretical systems of abstract 
concepts that give account of it like a whole according to its principles 
and laws.”4 
ii) The Substantive rationality of platonic-Weberian tradition5 that 
orders the action in patterns of unique value to which all empirical 
reality must refer.6 It is incumbent on to the substantive rationality to 
make decisions in accordance with reality (the “Real thing”), which 
has an extra mental character.
iii) The practical rationality, which we will subdivide in three:
a) The practical rationality of Weberian tradition7 is that way of life oriented to 
the world according to purely pragmatic interests, that is to say , a tendency 
to organize the way of living in a practical and rational way according to 
personal interests (in a practical and rational way). “The practical rationality 
 1 CORTINA, Adela, 1994.
 2 LöWITH, Karl, 2005 (1932).
 3 JARAMILLO, Diego, 1998.
 4 Ibid., p. 24.
 5 KALBERG, Stephen, 1988.
 6 Ibid., p. 45.
 7 LöWITH, Karl, 2005 (1932).
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always indicates a widespread tendency to calculate and solve the routine 
everyday problems by means of patterns rationality action mean-aim in 
reference to the pragmatic personal interests.”8
b) The practical rationality of Kantian tradition would be the realm of the 
authentically moral action or having to be. “The practical rationality of 
Kant, in a deontological sense, excludes from the scope of the morality 
all teleological practical rationality for being determined by personal and/
or group interests and inclinations. The supremacy of the must be over the 
search of a good life sets up a dissociation within the practical rationality that 
is not easy to resolve/ of non easy resolution.”9
c) The hermeneutic rationality of Gadamer, who emphasizes the phronesis 
concept as a model of hermeneutical application, it means that as a 
practical rationality it assures to the practical philosophy its specificity 
as opposed to the technical planning “as a practical rationality assures 
to the practical philosophy its specificity opposite to the technical 
planning.”10
iv) The legal rationality of Aristotle, which is oriented to the common good 
so that each action of every free human being  is supposed to be carried on 
within a unique whole socio-political priority over the individual interest. 
v) The prudential-teleological rationality (of Aristotelian tradition), that 
deliberates in terms of uncertainty about the most appropriate means to reach 
an aim. Rules have to be applied to the specific cases taking into account the 
contextual data and orienting them to the ultimate aim happiness.11
 8 Ibid., p. 33.
 9 VARELA, Luis, 2009.
10 Ibidem.
11  CORTINA, Adela, 1994, pp. 32-35.
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 vi) The formal –teleological rationality, which implies a rational action from 
mean to aim that legitimizes a rational mean-aim similar to the rational 
calculation by reference to rules, laws or regulations universally applied.12 
“The rationality, then, comes united to the freedom of action in which it is 
freedom itself in the form of a ‘teleological’ rationality: the search of an aim 
defined by ultimate values or ‘ways of life’ through the free consideration 
of the appropriate means.”13 “Weber alludes also to a ‘valorative rationality’ 
that governs an action in accordance with values, thus, it is built according to 
convictions, without taking care of the foreseeable consequences.”14
vii) The strategic rationality, which is used by those who consider other 
interlocutors as means to reach their own aims.  This rationality is often treated 
like instrumental rationality or procedural rationality. “[...] The competitive 
threat of the surrounding, the external control of the organization and the 
uncertainty of the strategic topics [...]” are related to this kind of rationality.15 
viii) The communicative rationality, according to Adela Cortina, is related to 
the consequentialism in the sense that moral norms are valid according to the 
consequences that they have on those affected by them whenever they satisfy 
universal interests. This kind of rationality implies that every human being 
endowed with communicative competence is a valid interlocutor.16 Boland 
identifies, in our opinion, hastily, since he does note xamine other types of 
rationality, the rationality itself with the communicative rationality, but giving 
it a peculiar turn that relates it closely with the dialogic-platonic rationality17.
12 LöWITH, 2005 (1932),  p.33.
13 Ibid., p. 45.
14 VARELA, Luis, 2009.
15 DEAN, John & SHARFMAN, Mark, 1993, p. 587.
16 CORTINA, Adela, 1994, p. 32.
17 We will return to the relation between the rationality of Boland and the dialogic-platonic 
one. Cf. BOLAND, Lawrence, 2003a; 2003b.
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9- The dialogic-platonic rationality, according to what we understand, 
consists of a regulated way of Socratic refutation18 between interlocutors 
suitable for the critical discussion.
It is in this type of rationality that Boland bases his proposal. 
In order to understand the questionings that we have formulated to the 
interpretation that Boland makes of the dialogic –platonic rationality, we 
will start with certain details of the type of rationality that he proposes. 
2.2. The rationality according to Lawrence Boland.19 
Boland’s rationality supposes, on the one hand, the modification 
of the dialogic –platonic rationality from the concept of communicative 
rationality and, on the other hand, the reformulation of the concept of 
limited rationality. We will study both points thoroughly.
Herbert Simon replaced the figure of an agent who decides 
rationally by the one of an agent who decides with limited rationality, as a 
consequence of the three following facts: 
a) The human beings act based on incomplete information.
b) They can only explore a limited number of alternatives. 
c) They are incapable of assigning exact values to the results.20
18 This is neither what is known as a “negative moment” of the Socratic method nor the “posi-
tive moment” of the method. At least in the early dialogues the rejection is, to our criterion, 
the type of dialogic rationality that we propose in this work. As well, there is no “positive 
moment” or catharsis since these dialogues end in aporía.
19 Based on the Lecture given by Sandra Maceri at the II Congreso Internacional de Investi-
gación de la Facultad de Psicología de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata, “Psicología y 
Construcción de conocimiento en la época”, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, La Plata, 
Argentina, 2009.
20 WATKINS, John, 1970, p. 200.
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As mentioned, Boland 21 reformulates the concept of limited 
rationality in such a way that he proposes the critical rationality as a principle 
of limited rationality. 
According to our reconstruction of Boland’s arguments:22
(i) There is a type of rationality that can be interpreted with the rationality 
itself, that is identified with the critical rationality (CR) and that consists of 
the exercise of the refusal of theses of the interlocutor.
(ii) The CR supposes the principle of bounded rationality and denies 
that every human being is completely rational, that is to say, maximizer, 
in the sense of the neoclassic authors, when taking decisions.
(iii) The CR is related to the “limited emotionality”.
(iv) The limit between the rationality and the non rationality is blurred. 
However, the recognition of the limits of rationality does not imply 
that in the decision act the irrational abuse prevails, although the exercise 
of the critical rationality for the decision making distrusts the criterion of 
rationality as criterion of decision.23 
The exercise of rationality must be continuous, indeed because no 
agent is completely rational. This is an exercise whose aim is to extend the 
limit of the rationality. That is to say:
(v) It is necessary that every agent exerts the CR to decide the best thing in 
each case because every agent is rationally limited. 
(vi) The previous affirmations suppose the existence of limits of practical 
order for the human rationality.
(vii) This practical exercise of the CR implies to maximize the critic.
21 BOLAND, Lawrence, 1981, pp. 1031-1036.
22 BOLAND, Lawrence, 2008, pp. 2–6; 2003b, pp. 221-8; 1994, pp. 154-72.
23 SCARANO, 2007, p. 11.
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Instead of proposing the election or acceptance of hypothesis it 
emphasizes its critic or rejection.24 This point of view stresses the critical 
importance of the problems and the elimination of errors by means of the 
discussion of problems. Rationalism, in this sense, is synonymous of critical 
debate and elimination of errors. This is about non justificationist rationalism. 
A justificationist states that anyone who claims to have knowledge must 
demonstrate it, with a proof, that the supposed knowledge is true or probable. 
The inductivism, in this sense, is a justificationist example that failed in the 
demonstration.25 Boland’s rationality is not a conventionalist one either. In 
the presence of the failure of inductivism, the conventionalists replace the 
notion of truth or probability by some other criterion like corroboration.26
(viii) In virtue of the previous thing, it is necessary to (re)define the notion 
of rationality.
According to our interpretation, Boland (re)defines “rationality” as a 
critical intersubjective debate. This discussion entails the gradual elimination 
of the errors and, therefore, leads to the best of all the decisions. The learning 
from the elimination of errors must be systematic and the comparison of 
the results (successful or not) obtained in fact must be compared with the 
awaited results derived from the theory. It is necessary to insist here that the 
learning from the errors is of experimental order.
Thus, the communicative rationality and the principle of bounded 
rationality are reinterpreted by Boland as a rationality of intersubjective-
critic type of platonic tradition. According to this rationality, all men are 
24 BOLAND, Lawrence, 1997, p. 263.
25 SCARANO, Eduardo, 2007, p. 10.
26 Ibid., p. 11.
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valid interlocutors since the human rationality is dialogical. And, if we 
extend this interpretation to the level of behaviour we can say that the only 
way to determine which rules are moral is within the dialogue between those 
who carry them out.  
This supposes, to our criterion, putting back the debate about the 
psychologism from Boland, in the sense that the attainment of an intersubjective 
consensus seems to imply mechanisms of psychological character, although 
this aspect is not noticed or recognized explicitly by the author.27
However, Boland bases its proposal of rationality on the early 
platonic dialogues, especially on the Apology,28 the Crito29 and the Euthyphro.30 
Below, we will see why, in our opinion, his reasoning is objectable. 
2.3. The interpretation of the dialogic –platonic reason.
Let us begin with the affirmation that all the interlocutors are valid 
to maintain a dialogue in which learning might be possible.
Boland does not formulate restrictions in relation to some criterion 
to choose an interlocutor like valid. It is certain, nevertheless, that in his 
analysis of the Euthyphro he recognizes that “Euthyphro is obviously an 
expert [in religious matters] because only an expert would prosecute his own 
father.”31 However, it seems to us that Euthyphro is not an expert for the 
reason adduced but because he was, in fact, a kind of priest. Whichever 
case, the important thing is that Euthyphro is a specialist who, as such, is a 
27 BOLAND, Lawrence, 2008.
28 Ibid., p. 4.
29 Ibidem.
30 BOLAND, Lawrence, 1994, p. 260. 
31 Ibid. p. 161.
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valid interlocutor to strike up the Socratic dialogue precisely because he is 
a specialist. In fact, not all the interlocutors are valid: for Plato, the dialogic 
communication cannot be carried out with anyone. In this sense, there is no 
place for the assumption that every man, just for the fact of being a man, is 
rational and reasons dialogically.
Without a doubt, Socrates’ interlocutors are chosen by Plato very 
carefully. It is, in all cases, people who know or claim to know, about the subjects 
the dialogue proposes.  Thus, it is asked to soldier Laches, what is meant by 
courage, to Charmides, who is a reasonable person, what good sense is; since Lysis 
is a friend of Menexenus, Socrates asks him what friendship is. Hippias assures to 
have written a beautiful speech, for that reason Socrates interrogates him about 
what beauty is. In Republic I, the first interlocutor of Socrates is Cephalus, an old 
and rich man, who speaking about the serenity in the oldness, sustains that the 
wealth can help the sensible man to be right and also that having lived a right life 
grants a hope of well-being after death, because justice is the return of what it is 
owed. From there, Socrates installs the question about what justice is.
As it is observed, opposite to Boland´s thinking, not anyone is a valid 
interlocutor to exert the dialogue of Socratic character. In effect, the interlocutors 
are valid because they know about the subject to discuss. However, Boland does 
not seem to be right when he affirms that “Socrates is a student who tries to 
learn from Euthyphro, the expert”32 because Socrates is not ignorant either. In 
fact, Socrates knows the answer beforehand. For the same reason, it is not certain 
either that “Socrates examines himself the same way he does with others”33 as 
Boland maintains in his reference to the Apology and the Crito. 
32 Ibidem.
33 BLAUG, Mark, 1992 (1980), p. 43.
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Socrates knows he knows, or at least gives the impression of 
knowing which answer he is expecting. It would be pointless that he offers it 
to his interlocutor, though. The teacher´s role is to make the student think, 
to lead his student –interlocutor to discover the correct answer by means of 
an educative- dialogical work under the guidance of Socrates that is, in this 
sense, a teacher: the interlocutor will be constructing the correct answer with 
the help of his teacher. Only in this way he will be able to see the paradigm 
(model, concept, definition) to act then according to it. But the paradigm 
“itself ” exists  who constructs it. In this context “to construct” means to 
“discover”, to get closer to the eternal paradigm in question. The Socratic 
dialogue is more like an educative procedure for the education of geometry 
than a heuristic procedure to reach the empirical truth. 
The reference to the paradigm leads us directly to Boland´s second 
affirmation stated above. We will attempt to show that it is not correct to base 
psychologism on the Euthyphro as Boland does,34 because this dialogue, like 
all the (early) platonic ones, supposes a metaphysical essentialism. In fact, the 
essentialism is tied to the discovery of the error throughout the dialogue.
The Socratic rejection to the interlocutor´s response is not due to 
the fact that the answer is itself “false”, in the sense of not fitting with the 
observable phenomena, but to the fact that it is inadequate as a definition. 
For example, “it is pious to accuse to that whoever commits homicide.”
According to this, the interlocutor would be refuted or objected 
by Socrates because of not knowing what X is, though not preventing him 
from recognizing particular cases or instances of X. Still more, anyone 
could recognize, use or drink water, although all (or almost all) would be 
34 BOLAND, Lawrence, 1994, pp. 154-72.
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in a trouble if they had to offer a correct definition of it. If someone is not 
able to “look at” the paradigm, then he is not capable either to define it 
correctly. It might be pointed (by chance) a particular case, but it will not 
be possible to reach a correct definition. The definitions offered by Socrates´ 
interlocutors are unsuitable since they are, for example, too narrow or too 
broad. When Laches in 190a 4 -6 defines “courage” as “to remain in the 
position and not to flee in a battle” gives a definition too narrow since it 
is possible to be brave not only in the war. However, in 198 the definition 
of “courage like something beautiful” is too broad, because there might 
be something beautiful which can not predicate courage, for example a 
beautiful statue. What we want to emphasize is that Socrates seeks the 
correct definitions to the question “what is X”, and that definition will 
be only obtained by “looking” (knowing) the corresponding paradigm. 
If “the paradigm is not looked” (known), the essence of X is not defined 
and, in this regard, we are subject to errors, regardless of whether we have 
developed more or less skilfully in daily life.
This is about learning from the mistakes but not to look for the 
error deliberately, as a method, as Boland supposes: we encountered over 
the error but it would be perhaps preferable to know the correct answer in 
advance, knowing fully the ideas like the Socrates in Plato, who does not 
learn from the error but who “knows” already from the beginning. This 
is not about standing the criticism out by maximizing it:35 it is, rather, to 
refute according to certain rules. If the error arises, this is accepted and it is 
tried to surpass it, but this is not a methodological procedure, however, it 
is the consequence of a regulated and directed discussion. In effect, in the 
35 SCARANO, Eduardo, 2007.
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Euthyphro, the Crito and the Apology36 Plato proposes to learn discovering 
the error but following the “Socratic model of the dialogical rationality.”37
Let see how this model works in the Euthyphro case. 
To the Socratic question “what is piety?” Euthyphro responds: “well, I 
say that what I do now, to accuse whoever commits a crime and commits sin, is 
piety itself. In case of homicide, theft of temples or another thing this type, even 
if we refer to the father, mother or any other, not to accuse is impious.” (5de).
Instead of responding what the pious thing is, Euthyphro gives 
examples, among which he mentions his own way to act by having accused 
his father. Socrates, on the other hand, is not satisfied with the answer 
received, since his interest does not reside in getting examples of pious acts 
but in the essence of the piety. The problem is that when giving examples, 
Euthyphro does not realize that in order to affirm that certain acts are pious 
it is necessary, according to the roles of the Socratic dialogue, to have defined 
the essence of piety before.
It is proposed then a second attempt of definition. 
Socrates explains his aim to Euthyphro again: 
“Do you remember that I didn’t encourage you to expose to me one 
or two of the many pious acts, but the own character by which all the pious 
things are pious?” In fact, you affirmed that by a single character the impious 
things are impious and the pious things are pious [...]” (6d -9e).38
Socrates expects that Euthyphro, instead of mentioning certain 
pious acts, exposes which is really that character (eidos), so that, directing the 
36 BOLAND, Lawrence, 2008.
37 We took the expression “Socratic model of the dialogical rationality” from the course Dia-
lectic and ontology in Plato and Aristotle taught by Tomás CALVO in the UNAM, Facultad 
de Filosofía y Letras, Instituo de Investigaciones Filosóficas, 2004.
38 The Greek words are “eidos” and “idea”.
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sight to him and using it as a measure (paradeigma) it can be said that an act 
is or is not pious. (6e 3-7).
So if one knows what piety is, one is qualified to recognize it in the 
different actions. Returning to the second answer of Euthyphro, let’s see how 
this one is also rejected. 
After the first Socratic rejection, Eutifrón offers a second definition: 
“what pleases the gods is pious, and what doesn’t please them is impious.” 
(6e 11-7).
After insisting on the fact that according to the stories of the 
poets the gods do not always agree, Socrates proposes to his interlocutor 
to specify together what piety itself is because there is no doubt that there 
are different opinions and different kinds of disagreement. For example: if 
the disagreement resides in the number, the magnitude or the weight of 
two things, the discrepancy would then be eliminated by just counting, 
measuring or weighing such objects. (7b –c).
This kind of disagreement, then, wouldn’t be cause of hates, 
neither fights nor controversies. In effect, in the natural scope we find 
patterns objectively valid, which Socrates tries to find for the moral sphere. 
Therefore, when what causes the disputes and generates the conflicts are 
judgments about the good and the bad things, the fair and the unfair, the 
beautiful and the ugly, in relation to which the possibility of resorting to 
the canons and the universally accepted criteria is excluded, the dissent is 
explicable. It is especially true, in agreement with the Euthyphro’s thesis, 
because it refers to the differences between actions that please some gods 
but do not please others. The inevitability of such disagreements reveals 
that this thesis is unacceptable, since, still accepting that the pious thing is 
what pleases some gods and the impious thing is what some others dislike. 
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There wouldn´t be a way to determine, objectively, which acts are for them 
object of pleasure or anger, since what some of them love is detested by 
others. Consequently, it can´t either be known, when the same criterion is 
used, if the conduct of that who accuses his own father is or not pious and 
deserves or not the divine approval, because it could have pleased Zeus but 
not Kronos or Uranus (8a –b).
The second definition is, then, invalid.
Finally, and after the rejection of the other definitions, Euthyphro 
responds that piety consists of pleasing the gods with sacrifices and prayers. 
(14b3). But if to make a sacrifice consists of giving gods and to pray consists 
of begging, piety would be the science of requests and offerings to the gods. 
(14cd). If we ask something to the gods is because we need to receive what we 
request, and if we offer something in return, it will be necessary to suppose that 
they lack what we give them. Piety would be, according to this, certain kind 
of commercial art between the gods and men. Euthyphro recognizes that they 
cannot benefit from our offerings, these offerings only show our veneration 
and tribute to the gods, and our desire to please them. (15a). However, if we 
admit the previous thing, we conclude that piety is what pleases the gods. 
Socrates adds that piety pleases the gods for being pious, and not that piety 
is so for being wanted by the gods. By virtue of the first, piety is an instance 
to which the gods themselves are subjected, unlike the second alternative that 
makes of piety the product of an agreement between the gods. 
In response, Socrates proposes to start all over again and try to find 
out “what is X”, in this case, piety, but Euthyphro decides to go away and 
farewell to Socrates. 
The dialogue that we have just seen does not consist, as Boland 
believes, in learning from the error through the criticism, understood as an 
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exercise of maximizing rejection. In fact, the student achieves the essence 
of the phenomena under the guidance of the teacher. In effect, before 
each answer of its interlocutors to the question “what is X?” (where X is 
piety, courage, good sense, friendship, beauty or justice) the dissatisfaction 
of Socrates is evident. Socrates interrogates about the essence, about what 
we could denominate “the-in-itself ”. It is thus an apparent contradiction 
between the multiplicity of beautiful things, fair or pious and the unity of 
the Idea of Beauty, Justice or Piety. In Meno 74 a –c, for example, Socrates 
says that “since you call all these things with a single name, tell me which one 
is that only thing that you mean all along”.
Considering what was told up to here, we can talk about a Socratic 
realism (in opposition to what is known as psychologism) in the sense that 
Socrates is convinced that this essence, this unit of multiplicity (the Idea), 
is not the result of a convention at which we arrive by means of  a debate 
using the refutative method but a result that agrees with the really existing 
and independent thing (5d) and which necessarily must be reached, and 
that is already present in the mind of the teacher from the beginning of the 
dialectic process. 
2.4. Summary of Section I.
After exposing the different types of rationality commonly 
accepted without further discussion, we have seen that Boland retakes the 
concept of communicative rationality reformulating it as intersubjective-
critical rationality. We demonstrate how this type of rationality is closely 
related to the dialogic-platonic rationality to the point that Boland 
bases this election appealing to the early platonic dialogues, specially 
the Euthyphro, the Apology and the Crito. As a strategy to show our 
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disagreement with Boland’s interpretation, we have chosen to provide an 
analysis of the Euthyphro, since this is the most extensive dialogue treated 
by Boland. Our reading seems to make clear that Boland accepts that any 
rational interlocutor is valid, attributing this characteristic, inadvertently, 
to the platonic Socrates. He also accepts, though we think in an inadequate 
way, that the dialectic procedure is a heuristic refutative method that 
consists of beginning, between two valid interlocutors, a search process 
and elimination of the error with opened end, that is to say, a process 
that enables the two participants to reach the new knowledge.  However, 
Boland lays the foundations of the scientific process on what he considers 
the truth Popper, based on his reading of the first Plato. We will then 
examine this point. 
3. Section II. The Real Popper according to Lawrence Boland.
Although inadequate, as we believe to have shown, Boland´s 
interpretation about the Apology, the Crito and the Euthyphro constitutes the 
textual base of his interpretation of the Popperian method. Let´s take the 
following quote as illustration: 
“[The Socratic dialogue] of Plato provides a good metaphor to help 
to understand the Popper´s conception of the science process; that is to say, 
that the science is a critical theory without a method that can guarantee a 
desired result.”39 In the Socratic-platonic dialogue, as we saw, the wished 
result is guaranteed beforehand through a type of knowledge that, appealing 
to Husserl´s terminology, we could call “eidetic intuition”, or “immediate 
capture” of Ideas, reason why Plato and his dialectic method are not a good 
39 BOLAND, Lawrence, 1994, p. 160. 
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antecedent for the method proposed by Boland. Indeed, according to Popper, 
the limit between the science and the pseudoscience is determined by the 
fact that scientific theories must be falsifiable, i.e., its consequences must 
be observable and should give rise to contrast and possible refutation.40 But 
this simple criterion is not enough because, if so, other disciplines such as 
astrology, psychoanalysis or historical materialism, for example, that fulfil this 
condition, would be catalogued as scientific, fact that Popper himself denies. 
A possible alternative would be to suggest that, in order to be scientific, the 
theories must not only be falsables but also not to have ever been rejected 
by the facts. Nevertheless, this solution, besides eliminating the elaboration 
of the horoscopes as a scientific task, could still eliminate what we want to 
keep as a scientific practice, in the sense that many scientific theories do not 
totally coincide with each observation.41 For that reason, for a sophisticated 
falsacionist, it is possible to modify the theories according to the apparent 
falsations, to the point of holding the theory up till success.42 In this way, 
Popper would be resembled as a type of “dogmatic” philosopher, as we 
read in the following quote: “I have always emphasized the need of certain 
dogmatism: the dogmatic scientist has an important role to play. If we fall in 
the criticism with too much facility we will never know where the real power 
of our theories is.”43 It seems, then, that the dogmatism has an important 
role in the falsacionism. In fact, Popper usually thinks that it is necessary to 
maintain (not to reject) the theories with apparent falsations.44
40 SCARANO, Eduardo, 2007.
41 CHALMERS, Alan, 1991 (1976), p. 93. 
42 Ibidem.
43 POPPER, Karl, 1995, p. 55.
44 SCHILPP, Paul, 1977; SIMON, Herber, 1962 (1947), p. 56.  
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However, there is no doubt that Popper considers the criticism 
to the point of magnifying the critical attitude in science. Still, we should 
wonder what the Popperian criticism consists of, then: how can dogmatism 
and criticism be recommended simultaneously? The answer we propose is 
based on a reconsideration of which Boland denominated the “Socratic 
Popper”. According to our reading of the Popperian texts, Popper is 
Socratic in two senses. In the first (i), Popper is Socratic as far as Socrates 
is understood like the Socrates that displays the first Plato to us, the one 
of the Euthyphro.
On the other hand, ii) Popper is Socratic as far as Socrates is the 
historical Socrates, not the character of the first platonic dialogues. With 
regard to this last one, in the Lecture given by Popper when he was awarded 
the Honorary Ph.D. of the Complutensian University of Madrid (Spain) in 
1991, he recognizes in the Socratic proposal of philosophy the right path for 
the scientific task. 
“We do not know anything – that´s the first point-. Therefore, we 
should be very modest –that´s the second point. And we shouldn´t assure 
that we know when we don´t know –that´s the third point”45
This is the central idea of Popper inspired, as he confesses, in Socrates, 
but in the historical Socrates: we can never be sure of anything, which has 
important consequences for the way in which we approach epistemology 
and the critical debate in general. Popper argued that this should make us 
more humble and modest in relation to the scientific knowledge and make 
us see, in general, our multiple limitations.46
45 POPPER, Karl, 2008.
46 TURNER, 2002.
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The Socratic Popper in the sense (ii) would support Boland´s 
interpretation. In “Scientific thinking without scientific method: two 
views of Popper”, Boland mistrusts the fact that the Popperian method as 
understood by the epistemologists of the economy is indeed the one that 
Popper itself would accept.47 The real Popper, according to Boland, is the 
Socratic Popper. In agreement with the “popular” Popper the key of the 
scientific task, and the science progress, is the falsation: the false theories are 
replaced by others until they match with the experience. Thus, “even though 
we can´t justify our theories in a rational way , and not even prove that they 
are probable, we can criticize them in a rational and objective way, looking 
for and eliminating errors to the service of the truth, thus distinguishing 
between better and worse theories.”48
From our point of view, the Popper that Boland rescues is different 
from the other one– that Boland does not deny - in the sense that, for the 
Popper of the Lecture, the falsation wouldn’t be the key of the scientific 
activity. By the way, we are not seeking for the falsation of the theories but of 
their inevitable rejection.49 And this rejection is based on criticism. Precisely, 
the theories are rejected because they do not resist the critics.50 However, the 
difference between the Popper that Boland calls “popular”, and the Popper 
that promotes the methodological criticism, does not reside in the critic but 
rather in the unrestricted exercise and, that is, “dogmatism” of criticism. 
Let´s see something more of the critical Popper, that Boland calls “Socratic”, 
and whom he considers the authentic one. 
47 BOLAND, Lawrence, 1994, p. 160.  
48 POPPER, Karl, 2007 (1972), p. 55. 
49 Ibid., p. 263.
50 SCARANO, Eduardo, 2007.
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Popper proposes the constant exercise of the “critical reason”. As 
we saw, to the eyes of Boland, this exercise results analogous to the method 
of Socratic rejection (as we have seen, the Popperian method is showed 
in action in the Euthyphro). In each occasion, an individual is constantly 
solving problems (“problematic orientation”51). This proposal presumes 
that an individual always acts to achieve his objective using means available 
foot it (“situational analysis”52). Boland establishes here the difference with 
the neoclassic economist: this one conceives the consumer trying to solve a 
problem that is, by definition, a matter of choice. “It is important to notice 
that the problematic orientation is always retrospective. The consumer has 
already made a choice and the economist post hoc tries to explain how this 
choice was done”.53 It is true that the Socratic Popperian methodology also 
values the error as it was made by the falsationist method or the method of 
the popular Popper: 
“Science should be seen as a process that is (potentially) in constant 
flow instead of a process that establishes incorrigible stable truths. There are 
no infallible methods, neither authorities nor unquestionable facts. Science 
is scientific thought without scientific method”54.
If we ask ourselves which Popper we should call “real”, it would 
be just a matter of emphasis: the Socratic Popper emphasizes criticism, but 
criticism is exercised through the refutation and the refutation itself has 
limitation, as the Popper of the “Lecture” says, when making concessions 
and accepting a certain dogmatism. 
51 Ibidem.
52 HUTCHISON, Terence, 1978.
53 SCARANO, Eduardo, 2003, p. 20.
54 Ibidem.
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In addition, the foundation that offers Boland of the methodology 
of the authentic Popper rests in what we will denominate “oral Popper”, 
analogous to the “oral Plato”. Popper´s disciples were reporting his modus 
operandi in the Seminar of Tuesday evenings during the 50´s in the London 
School of Economics but, of course, not all of them refer to the same 
and turns out to be too complex to reconstruct a method that should be 
presumed scientific from the supposed practice in class. It would be necessary 
to examine, then, if (as some consider in the case of Plato) the unwritten 
Popper expresses the methodology that the real Popper proposed. 
4. Conclusion
In this section we have seen that the “Popperian method” can be 
mentioned in many ways, fundamentally three: 
1) The Popper that Boland calls “popular”; that would be the false Popper.
2) The critic Popper, that Boland calls “Socratic”; that would be the 
authentic Popper.
3) The oral Popper. Since the authentically Popperian rational exercise is, always 
according to Boland, the one carried out in the Seminar of Tuesday evenings, 
which is not published, we propose that, before the task of discovering the 
“real Popper”, we should understand as such the oral Popper.
In this work we have offered, then, a way in which Popper can 
be considered Socratic in a platonic sense: the “dogmatic” Popper that we 
read in the “Lecture” would approximate to the Socratic figure when he 
proposes to maintain the theories against its initial refutations. Furthermore 
it is a way to understand the Socratism of Popper, closer to the Popper of the 
Seminar of Tuesday evenings, based on the oral Popper, but not justified by 
the analysis of the Plato´s texts. 
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